Despite the attention given in the literature to the issues of capital market imperfection and child labor (human capital accumulation), there is almost no evidence on the issue with the exception of the seminal paper of Jacoby et Skoufias (1997) .
In this paper, we exploit a unique data set for Guatemala containing information on access to credit markets, occurrence of several kinds of shocks and presence of insurance programs. The next section will briefly outline the theoretical foundations of the work, Section 3 illustrates the data set used and defines the variables. The econometric methodology adopted is described in Section 4, and the empirical results are presented in the Section 5.
Credit Market Imperfection and Children's Work
The theoretical background of the paper rests on two sets of "classical" results about the role of credit markets in determining human capital accumulation.
Recent works, building on the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1976) , have shown that borrowing constraints may represent an important source of inefficiency in the allocation of household resources to human capital investment (Ranjan 2001, Baland and Robinson 200 and Cigno, Rosati, Tzannatos 2002) . If households do not have access to capital markets, they might be resource constrained and under invest in the human capital of their children. Better access to credit might, therefore, contribute to a reduction in child labor.
In an uncertain world, perfect capital markets would allow households to base investment decisions, including those on human capital, only on the relative rate of returns.
Because the completeness of capital markets allows to households "insure" themselves from the expected shocks, child labor would not be influenced by negative shocks.
Child work (as shown in a companion paper) shows a high degree of persistence, making transition back to school problematic. If households move children to the (internal or external) labor market to cope with shocks, the costs of "uninsured" shocks can therefore be quite high in terms of human capital accumulation.
Determining that credit market imperfection and shocks affect the household decision concerning children's labor supply would have far reaching implications in terms of policy.
In particular, a whole set of policies aimed at promoting development of capital markets, and at improving risk coping and risk reduction mechanisms, would become relevant as instruments to reduce child work and increase human capital accumulation. The strategic relevance of such policies has recently been strongly stressed by the World Bank ( Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2002, and World Bank 2001) ; this paper aims to offer further empirical support to such a policy approach.
Recent research has shown that income has a relatively small effect on the supply of child work (Cigno et al. 2002, Deb and Rosati 2001) . Sustained income growth or large transfer programs would be necessary to substantially reduce child work. Moreover, it has been shown (Deb and Rosati, 2001 ) that different groups of households have very different propensities to invest in children's education, even if they have very similar sets of observable characteristics. Both findings are coherent with a potential role of credit rationing and the lack of " insurance" mechanisms, but they do not offer direct support to these hypotheses. The available evidence is, however, extremely scarce. Beyond the evidence contained in the seminal paper of Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) , some results based on a cross section of countries (Dehejia and Gatti, 2002) indicate that credit market development does have an impact on child labor. A recent paper by Edmonds (2002) performs an indirect test of the relevance of credit constraints for child work by evaluating the effects of an expected changes in household income.
In this paper we use a unique dataset on Guatemala that contains information on shocks, access to credit, availability of insurance mechanism. We will be able, given this information, to assess the relative importance of credit market, risk and policies on child labor and human capital accumulation.
The theoretical basis on which our empirical estimates will rest is well known, and no new insight is gained by presenting a formal model. We will therefore just outline the reference theoretical model and refer to the literature cited above for further details.
We assume that households maximize a utility function defined over current consumption and future (children's) consumption. Parents supply inelastically labor, whose returns are used to finance current consumption. Children's time can be used either to further increase current consumption through work, to accumulate human capital, or for leisure (above the minimum level physiologically required). Human capital determines children's future consumption. The household can change the intertemporal allocation of consumption by changing the children's labor supply 1 . The presence of credit rationing restricts the budget set of the household and, if binding, will generate inefficiently low level of investment in human capital. Moreover, household income net of children contribution is not certain, but rather subject to shocks. If capital markets were complete, the realization of such shocks would not affect children's labor supply (and consumption), as they would be insured.
The class of models just described predicts four possible outcomes for children's activities: three corner solutions and one internal solution. A child can attend school full time, work full time, do ne ither or combine work and school. The decision of the household concerning the activities of their children will be guided by an unobservable utility index I :
where Z indicates set of household characteristics including household expected or "permanent" income net of children's contribution, X indicates a set of proxies for the rate of returns to child work and for cost and returns to schooling, C indicates a set of variable relating to credit rationing, access to, public or private, insurance mechanisms, and S indicates realized shocks.
Data Set and Variable Definitions
Information on poverty, household conditions and other variables was collected in Guatemala through the 2000 Living Standards Measurement Survey (ENCOVI, 2000) . The survey followed a probabilistic survey design, covering 7,276 households (3,852 rural and 3,424 urban) . The survey is representative at the national and regional level as well as in urban and rural areas. ENCOVI included questions to elicit a unique l evel of detail (for a representative sample) on themes related to vulnerability. The survey included modules on risks and shocks; conflict, crime, and violence; social capital; and migration. The data set for Guatemala is also unique in containing informa tion on access to credit, shocks and insurances. As most of our attention will be devoted to such variables, we now discuss their exact definition and present some summary statistics.
Credit rationing. The survey contains a set of questions related to access to credit. In particular, households are asked whether they have applied for credit and, in case of application, whether they were denied the credit. We define as "credit rationed" households that did not apply for credit for one of the following reasons: a) Institutions offering credit not available b) Does not know how to ask for credit c) Does not have the required characteristics d) Does not have collateral e) Interest rates too high f) Insufficient income g) Institutions do not give credit to household in that conditions. We also classify as credit rationed households that applied for, but were denied, credit (see appendix 3 for details of the questions). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for credit rationed household broken down by level of poverty 2 . About 50 per cent of the households in Guatemala are credit rationed according to our definition. The incidence rises with poverty, ranging from about 40 per cent for households above the poverty line to almost 70 per cent for extreme poor households. In absolute terms, lack of income, lack of collateral and household conditions are the most and the number of school age children (numkidso); a dummy variable taking value 1 if the child is a girl and there are children aged 0-5 in the household (femkidsy); and a series of dummy variables for the education of the mother (M_) and of the father (F_).
Child Work in Guatemala
Child work is very common in Guatemala. Some 506,000 children aged 7-14 years, one-fifth of total children in this age group, are engaged in work. Most are employed on the family farm or in petty business and are located in rural areas. Guatemala ranks third highest in child work prevalence of the 14 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries where data are available, behind only Bolivia and Ecuador. In terms of GDP per capita, on the other hand, the country ranks fifth lowest of the 14 countries. Guatemala's relative level of child work is therefore high compared to its relative level of income.
The decision to consider the age range 7 to 14 in order to define child work is based on several grounds. School starts at 7 in Guatemala and no significant amount of child labor is found below the age of 7. The basic cycle of education (ciclo basico) requires in most cases 9 years of study to be completed. It should be noted, on the other hand, that current legislation allow children to work legally as from the age of 14. We decided, however, to keep the age range coherent with the completion of the basic cycle of education, also to facilitate international comparison. Nothing of substance changes in the results if we define child work over the age range 7-13.
The f ollowing table gives more detailed information on children's activities in Guatemala. It shows that a significant proportion of children -17 percent -is reportedly neither working nor attending school. This group includes children (mainly girls) performing full time household chores, "hidden" workers and children for whom school attendance is too expensive or impossible due to lack of infrastructure, but that do not have opportunities to perform any productive activities. "Idle" children, a group almost as large as that of working children, also constitute an important policy concern; they not only do not go to school, but are at risk of becoming part of the labor force. This group is the most sensitive to changes in policy and in exogenous variables.
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The table shows that gender differences in child activity status are important: boys are more likely to work, but girls are more likely to be neither working nor attending school. It also shows that children of indigenous households have a lower school attendance rate and a higher work participation rate than the rest of the population. 
Econometric Methodology: Propensity Scores, ATT and Sensitivity Analysis
The main econometric problem we face in estimating the effects of credit rationing, insurance and shocks is the potential endogeneity of these variables. To be credit rationed, to belong to an insurance scheme, or to be part of a social security system can all to a certain extent be endogenous. Even the occurrence of a shock cannot be treated as fully exogenous:
if strong winds destroy the roof the outcome can partially depend on the way the roof was build. This in turn can be seen as a decision t aken from the household not independently from those regarding children's labor supply and school attendance. Given the relevance of the endogeneity issue for the results presented in this paper, we discuss the matter at some length in the Appendix A in order to support the approach followed here which is based on propensity score matching methods and regression analyisis. Given that, as shown in many papers, analyses involving adjustments for unobservables tend to be quite subjective and very sensitive to distributional and functional assumptions and usually rely on the existence of a valid instrument, our analysis rests on the so-called unconfoundedness assumption, similar to the so-called selection on observables assumption: exposure to treatment is random within cells defined by observed variables X. We then use propensity score (i.e. the individual probability of receiving the treatment given the observed covariates) and regression methods to "adjust" the best possible way for all the pre-intervention covariates.
We now discuss how the propensity score will be specified and used for analysing the effects of shocks, insurance and credit rationing on child labor and school attendance.
Credit rationing, as well as shocks and insurance, is defined at the household level. A child is affected as long as the household to whom she belongs is also affected. This means that these treatment variables are assigned at the level of households, even if we want to analyse their effects on children. The clustered structure of the units of analysis (children) has some methodological implications. First of all, because the assignment is at the household level, assignment can be assumed ignorable (or even unconfounded) only if we condition on the households and their characteristics. In terms of propensity score modelling, the score must be defined at the household level, thus being the probability that a single household with a vector of characteristics, x, is credit rationed (or subject to a shock, or insured). In order to be consistent with the hypothesized assignment mechanism, the vector should also include summary characteristics of the children in each household (e.g. the number and age of the children).
Once the propensity score are estimated using households as units of analysis, the estimated propensity score for treated and non treated households can be used to check the degree of overlap between the two groups in terms of the distribution of their characteristics.
The propensity score can also be used to estimate the ATT using a matching strategy.
Even if the outcome involves the children within the household, the outcome Y in this case must be defined at the household level. Summary measures of child labor or school attendance, such as the proportion of school-age children going to school, to work, etc. is appropriate. An explicit treatment of children as unit of analysis can only be appropriately done in a model such as the one introduced later.
As far as the matching procedure is concerned, in the paper we use a nearest neighbor matching, that for each of the T N treated (e.g., rationed) households looks for the nearest neighbor matching sets in the group of control households, defined as:
which usually contains a single control unit (household). Denoting the number of controls matched with treated observation i by C i N , then the matching estimator of ATT is
An estimate of the variance of this estimator can be derived analytically or using bootstrap methods (see Becker, Ichino, 2001 for details).
A further complication of our analysis is that we are interested in at least three potentially endogenous variables, namely credit rationing, insurance and the occurrence of shocks. It cannot be determined from the questionnaire the order of these treatments. In principle we could define a treatment variable as the combination of the three, but that would render the propensity score based analysis, as well as the interpretation of the results, more complicated. We opted instead to analyse the propensity scores for each variable separately and derive separate estimates of their ATTs 5 . Eventual interactions among these variables are then captured and analysed in the model specified subsequently.
Finally, in order to test for the consequences that a violation of the hypothesis of unconfoundedness could have on our causal conclusion we have performed a sensitivity analysis. proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended here to a multinomial outcome. In particular this method allows us to assess the sensitivity of the causal effects with respect to assumptions about an unobserved binary covariate that is associated with both the treatments and the outcome. Details of the methodology and of the results are reported in Appendix 2.
Some Results
Propensity scores have been estimated as the probability that a household with characteristics X is credit rationed, insured or experienced a shock, respectively. In each case, specification of the propensity score was achieved by checking if the balancing property of the estimated propensity score was satisfied 6 . The estimated propensity score distributions are shown in Appendix 5. The distributions of the propensity scores for "treated" and "non treated" groups of households overlap to a large extent. ATT on several outcome variables have been derived using a nearest neighbor matching estimator and results appear in Tables 5 to 8 .
The results obtained are very similar to those stemming from the regression analysis discussed in the next section. We leave, therefore, a detailed discussion for later and provide a short summary here.
Credit rationing reduces school attendance and increases, especially, the number of "idle" children; individual shocks significantly increase the proportion of "working" and "working and studying" children, while reducing the "studying only" children. Collective shocks have similar effects, although the effects seem to be smaller in absolute terms. As discussed in the previous section, we have computed the propensity scores relative to our proxies for credit rationing, insurance and for the occurrence of shocks. As shown in Appendix 5, the distribution of the propensity scores for "treated" and "non treated" groups of households overlap to a large extent, allowing us to draw causal inference from a regression model with reasonable confidence, i.e. we can be confident that, under the unconfoundedness assumption, the use of a regression model does not imply that the estimation of treatment effects relies on extrapolation. Because of similar covariates' distributions for the treatment and control groups, model-based sensitivity should be very limited. Moreover, as reported in details in Appendix 2, the results obtained are robust with respect to the sensivity analysis carried out to assess the consequences of a violation of the unconfoundedness assumption. This gives us more confidence in the causal interpretation of our results.
We have used a multinomial logit 7 to model the household decisions concerning the four children's activities we consider (namely work only, work and study, study only, neither work nor study). All the coefficients for individual and househo ld level characteristics are significant and have the expected sign. Holding expenditure and other characteristics constant, girls are less likely than boys to become part of the labor force. They are more likely to attend school, but especially to be "idle". This probably indicates that they are more likely than boys to be involved full time in household chores.
Indigenous children are more likely to be working than other children, and the probability to work increases by 8 percentage points. Parents' education (above primary education is the omitted category) has a negative effect on child labor and a positive effect on school attendance. A child belonging to those households whose father is not educated is about 5 percentage points more likely to work full time and 13 percentage points more likely to be idle than a child belonging to household with better educated father. In the case of Guatemala we do not observe large differences between the impact of mother and father education.
7 The multinomial logit model is even more flexible than the usual bivariate probit model, that takes account of the simultaneity of the decisions only through the correlation of the error terms. In fact, the covariates in the multinomial logit model may explicitly have a different effect on the probability of taking one of the four decisions. Also note that usual weakness of the conditional logit model, namely the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, does not apply when, as in our case, most or all the covariates are individual characteristics (as opposed to choice specific characteristics) and each of them has coefficients that are choice specific (i.e. each of them enter the underlying stochastic utilities with a different coefficient): in this case cross elasticities are not constant and including another alternative to the choice set does not leave the odds of the other alternatives unchanged. 8 Computed at the mean. Household expenditure reduces child labor and increases full time school attendance.
At the mean, an increase of 10 per cent in income reduces the probability of a child to work only or work and study of about 7 percentage points.
The proxies for access to credit, shocks and insurance are not only significant, but also show strong effects on household decisions regard children's activities; in addition the results are consistent with those found in the propensity score based analysis.
Credit rationing strongly reduces school attendance: the probability that a child belonging to a credit rationed household attends school is about 7 percentage points lower compared to non rationed household. Children from credit rationed households are more likely to be out of school without participating in the labor force. This finding seems to indicate that credit rationing especially influences investment in the human capital of children. The alternative to school is not necessarily work. Credit-rationed households would send their children to school, if they could have access to credit. Hence, returns to education are at the margin higher than returns to work. If households value children leisure, or there are fixed costs to send children to work, in presence of low returns to child labor creditrationed household will keep their children idle.
Idle children may lose twice: they do not obtain education, and they are also vulnerable to enter the labor force in presence of changing circumstances.
Households affected by shocks reduces children's full time school attendance, and increase child labor. Following a collective shock, children's participation increases by 5.5
percentage points. The largest part of these children are full time student, that start to work without dropping out of school.
Individual shocks have a similar overall effect with respect to the collective shocks.
Child labor participation for households hit by such a shock is about 5 percentage points higher than average. Individual shocks, however, mainly affect children attending school and increase the probability of work full time (1.5 percentage points), while only marginally influencing idle children. About two thirds of the children that enter the labor force continue, however, to attend school also.
These results highlight the fact that inability to obtain credit significantly affects household investment decision in human capital, rather then children's labor force participation. Shocks, on the contrary, directly affect children's labor force participation, most likely because of the need to compensate for unexpected loss of resources. This result confirms the importance of credit rationing for investment in human capital, and indicate that better access to credit is not necessarily a powerful instrument to facilitate removal of children from the labor force. Children who do not attend school nor work are children at risk of becoming workers, and they may actually be in worse conditions than working children, as they might receive a smaller allocation of resources 9 and do not even benefit from the increase in human capital from on-the-job training that their working children may receive.
Information on the availability of formal or informal insurance and "safety nets" mechanisms is scarce in the data set considered. As discussed above, we have utilized an indicator of whether any of the household members were covered by health insurance. The effect of this variable is far from negligible: children belonging to household where at least one member (usually the household head) is covered by health insurance are about 5
percentage points less likely to work only or to work and study. Such a large effect should not come to a surprise if one consider that about 15 per cent of the idiosyncratic shocks are linked to health conditions and that other kinds of shocks can be at least in part influenced by health conditions. The inference obtained from the use of this variable might be limited by the fact that holding an health insurance could proxy for income and education effects.
Better-paid jobs might have attached to them such a scheme or more educated parents could be in a better position to evaluate the advantage of an insurance. However, the estimates are obtained controlling for income and parent's education. This gives further support to the conclusion that we are actually capturing differential effects on household behavior due to insurance coverage.
As mentioned above, credit rationing and shocks not only significantly influence child work and school attendance, but these effects are also relatively large. As a rough impression of the size of the effects of these variable, consider that in order to achieve an increase in school attendance equal to that due to the elimination of credit rationing, an income increase of 30 per cent would be required. To match the effects of eliminating the consequences of a negative individual shock on child work, an increase in income of about 20 per cent would be required. Similar figures can be obtained for the other variables.
Policies aimed at favoring access to credit markets and to providing safety nets, especially to poorer households, appear to be amongst the most powerful instruments for promoting school attendance and reducing child work. Moreover, the income equivalent needed to compensate for the effects of credit rationing and shocks also indicates that policies aimed at reducing risk are not only effective, but may prove to be also cost efficient in terms of use of resources.
Conclusion
Recently a growing attention has been paid to policies aimed at reducing the vulnerability of households and at promoting risk reduction strategies. The World Bank has developed a Social Risk Management strategy (see the works already quoted) that is increasingly on more incorporated in the Bank's coming activities Until now the Social Risk Management approach has focused mainly, but not exclusively, on targeting vulnerability to poverty as defined by consumption. Obviously there are other dimensions of household behavior that are important from the point of view of risk management and vulnerability especially in an dynamic setting. Human capital investment and child labor are not only important dimensions of household welfare, but they also influence future income vulnerability and current and future health. In this paper we have tried to assess whether risk and vulnerability are also relevant for the set of the decisions concerning children's school attendance and labor supply. In particular we have aimed to evaluate the effect of shocks, credit rationing and ins urance on the households decisions concerning children's activities.
On the basis of a theoretical approach based on well known results relative to human capital investment decision and children's labor supply, we have developed an estimation strategy that allow us to assess the importance of a set of risk factors.
We have used a very rich data set from Guatemala that contains information on shocks, credit rationing and insurance. Because of the potential endogeneity of the variable of interest, we used a m ethodology based on propensity scores. The analysis of the distribution of propensity scores for the "treated" and "not treated" population for the population of interest allows us to conclude that, given the maintained hypothesis of unconfoundedness (selection on observables), we can safely draw causal inference from our estimates. The computed ATTs confirm the main results obtained through the regression analysis.
The main results indicate that credit rationing is extremely important in determining the ho usehold's decision to invest in the human capital of children. This variable is, however, less relevant in changing the household decision relative to children's labor supply. The main effects being linked to the decision to leave the children "idle" or to send them to school.
Even if it does not directly affect children's labor supply, credit rationing appears to be a very important determinant of children's vulnerability as "idle" children are particularly at risk of becoming workers and often face circumstances that are even harder than those of working children.
Shocks substantially alter household decisions and a negative shock substantially increases the probability that a child will work. Coupled with the evidence from other research that child labor shows a high degree of persistence, this indicates the importance that protection from shocks would have in reducing children's labor supply and increasing human capital investment.
Finally risk reduction schemes, proxied in our analysis by the availability of medical insurance also showed substantial effect on child work. 
APPENDIX 1: Econometric Methodology
Empirical applications in economics often struggle with the question of how to accommodate (often binary) endogenous regressor(s) in a model aimed at capturing the relationship between the endogenous regressor(s) and an outcome variable.
Problems of causal inference involve "what if" statements, and thus counterfactual outcomes and are usually motivated by policy concerns. They can be "translated" into a treatment-control situation typical of the experimental framework.
The fact that the treatment is endogenous reflects the idea that the outcomes are jointly determined with the treatment status or, that there are variables related to both treatment status and outcomes. "Endogeneity" thus prevents the possibility of comparing "treated" and "non treated" individuals: no causal interpretation could be given to such a comparison because the two groups are different irrespective of their treatment status.
A growing strand of applied economic literature has tried to identify causal effects of interventions from observational (i.e. non experimental) studies, using the conceptual framework of randomised experiments and the so-called potential outcomes approach, that allows causal questions to be translated into a statistical model 10 . While it is possible to find some identification strategies for causal effects even in non experimental settings, data alone do not suffice to identify treatment effects. Suitable assumptions, possibly based on prior information available to the researchers, are always needed.
In this paper we will use the potential outcomes approach to causal inference, based on the statistical work on randomized experiments by Fisher and Neyman, and extended by Rubin (see Holland 1986) . In recent years, many economists have accepted and adopted this framework 11 because of the clarity it brings to questions of causality. Unconfoundedness is a special case of ignorable missing mechanisms and holds when P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X) = P(T = 1| X) and X is fully observed. Unconfoundedness is similar to the so called "selection on observables" assumption (also exogeneity of treatment assignment), which states that the value of the regressor of interest is independent of potential outcomes after accounting for a set of observable characteristics X. This approach is equivalent to assuming that exposure to treatment is random within the cells defined by the variables X. Although very strong, the plausibility of these assumptions rely heavily on the amount and on the quality of the information on the individuals contained in X.
Under unconfoundedness one can identify the average treatment effect within subpopulations defined by the values of X:
and also the overall ATT as :
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of X in the population. If we could simply divide the sample into subsamples, dependent on the exact value of the covariates X, we could then take the average of the within subsample estimates of the average treatment effects. Often the covariates are more or less continuous, so some Therefore it is crucial to check the extent of the overlapping between the two distributions, and the "region of common support" for these distributions. When the number of covariates is large, this task is not an easy one. An approach that can be followed is to reduce the problem to a one-dimensional one by using the propensity score, that is, the individual probability of receiving the treatment given the observed covariates p(X) = P(T = 1| X). In fact, under unconfoundedness the following results hold (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a) 1. T is independent of X given the propensity score p(X) 2. Y(0) and Y(1) are independent of T given the propensity score
From (1) we can see that the propensity score has the so-called balancing property, i.e., observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribution of observable (and possibly unobservable) characteristics independently of the treatment status; from (2), exposure to treatment and control is random for a given value of the propensity score. These two properties allow us to a) use the propensity score as a univariate summary of all the X, to check the overlap of the distributions of X, because it is enough to check the distribution of the propensity score in the two groups, and b) use the propensity score in the ATE (or ATT) estimation procedure as the single covariate that needs to be adjusted for, as adjusting for the propensity score automatically controls for all observed covariates (at least in large samples). In this paper we will use the estimated propensity score to serve purpose a) to validate the regression results, and purpose b) by estimating the ATT with a propensity score based matching algorithm.
The analysis of the propensity score alone can be very informative because it reveals the extent of the overlap in the treatment and comparisons groups in terms of pre-intervention variables. The conclusion of this initial phase may be that treatment and control groups are too far apart to produce reliable estimates without heroic modelling assumptions.
The propensity score itself must be estimated: if the treatment is binary, any model for binary dependent variables can be used, although the balancing property should be used to choose the appropriate specification of the model, i.e. how the observed covariates enter the model. Some specification strategies are described in Becker and Ichino (2001) and Rubin (2002) . Propensity score methods can be extended to include multiple treatments (Imbems, 2000; Lechner 2001 ).
The assumption that the treatment assignment is ignorable, or even unconfounded, underlies much of the recent economic policy intervention evaluation strategies (Jalan, Ravallion, 2001) , so that one might have the impression that researchers no longer pay much attention to unobservables. The problem of the analyses involving adjustments for unobserved covariates, such as the Heckman's type corrections (Heckman, Hotz, 1989) , is that they tend to be quite subjective and very sensitive to distributional and functional specification. This has been shown in a series of theoretical and applied papers (Lalonde, 1986; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Copas and Li, 1997) . The adjustment for unobserved variables, however, strongly relies on the existence of valid instruments, i.e. on variables that are correlated with T but are otherwise independent of the potential outcomes. If such variables exist, they can then be used as a source of exogenous variation to identify causal effects (Angrist, Imbens, 1995; Angrist, et al., 1996) ; the validity of a variable as an instrument, i.e., the validity of the exclusion restrictions, cannot be directly tested. In observational studies such variables are usually very hard to find, although there are some exceptions (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999 , for some examples).
Thus, despite the strength of the unconfoundedness assumption, that, nevertheless, cannot be tested, it is very hard not to use it in observational studies: it is then crucial to adjust the "best" possible way for all observed covariates. Propensity score methods can help achieve this. The issue of unobserved covariates should then be addressed using models for sensitivity analysis (e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b) or using non parametric bounds for treatment effects (Manski, 1990; Manski et al., 1992) .
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APPENDIX 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Our analysis of the effects of credit rationing, insurance and the occurrence of shocks is based on the critical assumption of unconfoundedness; as in all observational studies, our results might be subjects to dispute since this assumption rules out the role of the unobservables. In order to check how robust our causal conclusions are, we now apply a method for sensitivity analysis, proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended here to a multinomial outcome. In particular this method allow us to assess the sensitivity of the causal effects with respect to assumptions about an unobserved binary covariate that is associated both with the treatments and with the response.
The unobservables are assumed to be summarized by a binary variable in order to simplify the analysis, although similar techniques could be used assuming other distributions for the unobservables. Note however that a Bernoulli distribution can be thought of as a discrete approximation to any distribution, and thus we believe that our distributional assumption will not severely restrict the generality of the results.
Suppose that treatment assignment is not unconfounded given a set of observable variables X, i.e., P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X) is not equal to P(T = 1| X) but unconfoundedness holds given X and an unobserved binary covariate U, that is P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X, U) is equal to P(T = 1| X, U).
We can then judge the sensitivity of conclusions to certain plausible variations in assumptions about the association of U with T, Y(0), Y(1) and X. If such conclusions are relatively insensitive over a range of plausible assumptions about U, then our causal inference is more defensible.
Since Y(0), Y(1) and T are conditionally independent given X and U, we can write the joint distribution of (Y(t), T, X, U) for t = 0, 1 as
where, in our analysis, we assume that π represents the proportion of individuals w ith U=0 in the population, and the distribution of U is assumed to be independent of X. This should render the sensitivity analysis more stringent, since, if U were associated with X, controlling for X should capture at least some of the effects of the unobservables. The sensitivity parameter α captures the effect of U on treatment receipt (e.g., credit rationing), while the δ ti ,'s are the effects of U on the outcome.
Given plausible but arbitrary values to the parameters π , α and δ ti , we estimated the parameters γ and β j by maximum likelihood and derived estimates of the ATT as follows:
These estimates of the ATT are comparable to the ones based on the propensity score based matching procedure and they are very similar to the marginal effects obtained. 
APPENDIX 3:
Questions used to define the some of the variables used in the estimation
Questions used to Define Credit Rationed Households
What is the principal reason that no one applied for a loan?
In the community no one offer loans…………………………………. 
